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명량해전에 관한 고찰 (영문)

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역사적으로 중요한 전투에 관해서

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오늘 이걸 다시 보게 되니~~

감회가 새롭네요...

이걸 제가 썼다니 ㅎㅎ 

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것도 영어로 ㅠㅠ


'명량해전'에 관한 분석자료 입니다.. 


구국의 영웅 성웅 충무공 이순신 제독 만세~~~


Battle of Myongnyang in Imjin War

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how two adversaries prepared a historical battle within a war based on their assets, capabilities, and strategies.  The Japanese invasions of Korea, also known as the Imjin war (Hawley, 2005, p. 1-664), began in 1592 and lasted until 1598.  Shortly after the outbreak of war, Chinese armed forces intervened against Japan (Hawley, 2005, p. 228).  During the Imjin war, there was one main historical battle called “The Battle of Myongnyang”, which had huge impact on changing the entire war in opposite direction.  I intend to lay out the road to war, the misjudgments and mistakes of each side, and the courses of action which could have changed the battle’s outcome.

Prior to the Imjin war, Korea was in a state of weakening national power.  Political disputes, lack of adaptability, and lack of preparation all contributed to the perception that Korea was weak.  The reason for the lack of preparedness was the simple fact that Southeast Korea had never been in a state of war prior to this invasion (Niderost, 2015, p. 1).  Piracy was a major problem for the Koreans, however this was a blessing in disguise.  To keep up with the pirates, the Korean Navy had to constantly train and upgrade their equipment however, they were unaware of how to utilize the equipment in land based operations (Martin, 2012, p. 1).

The Japanese armed forces were well trained, disciplined, and organized under the many experienced warlord commanders throughout the warring states period.  During the warring states period, the Japanese armed forces effectively refined their medieval style battle drills and tactics by adding matchlock rifle unit (Ford, 1997, p. 1).  Therefore, the Japanese armed forces’ refined battle tactics were combination of cavalry units, matchlock rifle units, archery units, spear units, and sword units.  The Japanese armed forces’ refined battle tactics were a great advantage over the Korean’s.  Korea was weak and Hideyoshi, Commander of the Japanese armed forces, took advantage of this to further his plans to invade mainland China (Polenghi, 2003, p. 1).

c5092047137a23aa1e1ef1638a9d154a_1637392767_914.jpg

Japanese’s land armed forces’ advancing routes during Imjin war (Adventure Blog, 2016, p. 1). 

 The Japanese under Hideyoshi began their invasion of the Koran peninsula on 23 May 1592.  They rapidly advanced to the Korea-China border in the north due to their possession of advanced weaponry that the Koreans simply never had.  However, despite reaching China so quickly, Hideyoshi ran into a major problem; how to transport the supplies he would need to conduct his invasion of China.  The roads in Korea were inadequate to move his supply trains northward, and the alternate plan of living off the local populace began to break down due to cultural differences.  The local populace began to revolt against the Japanese occupiers, initiating what would later be called guerilla warfare (Szczepanski, 2016, p. 1).

Following their ouster from Korea the Korean royal court began to request Chinese assistance.  The Chinese agreed but were quickly stopped themselves due to the technological superiority of the Japanese forces.  The lack of supplies ultimately forced the Japanese back from the Chinese border and into southern Korea.  In the end, the Japanese were forced to accept a three-year armistice as opposed to their dream of taking China (Aleksander, 2012, p. 1).    

However, Hideyoshi was not to be deterred.  On 1 March 1597 Hideyoshi began a second invasion of Korea.  This time, however the Korean royal court assisted Hideyoshi by removing an obstacle to his inability to resupply his forces; the Korean Navy.  The Korean royal court removed the Admiral Yi, Sun-shin, who was having success and replaced him with a much more incompetent one.  This gave Hideyoshi’s Navy the boost it needed and the Koreans were soundly defeated at the battle of Chilchoenryang Sea.  The Japanese now had control of the seas around the Korean Peninsula (Smyser, 2016, p. 1).

During the maritime battle at Chilcheonryang on 27 August 1597, a Korean Navy commander refused to fight and ran away with his 12 warships to the Southwest Sea region of Korea.  The Korean royal court placed these 12 warships under Admiral Yi’s command and soon faced the Japanese naval forces at Myongnyang Strait in Korea on 26 October 1597.

The Korean Navy warships were sturdy and more maneuverable than their Japanese counterparts.  Also, the fact that the ships were broadly built gave them stability while firing their cannons allowing them to utilize bigger cannons than their counterparts in the Japanese Navy (Turnbull, 2002, p. 88-89).

The Japanese Navy warships cruised in faster speeds compared to the Koreans Navy warships.  The V-shape structure resulted the Japanese Navy warship penetrating deeper into the water.  Therefore, the Japanese Navy warships’ turning radius required much wider than the Korean’s.  The Japanese Navy forces required much more lengthy process to change the direction of their warships when compared to the Koreans (Siggurdsson, 2013, p. 1).

The Japanese Navy forces had to limit on carrying cannons on their ship.  Because the structure of the Japanese Navy warship, V-shape of hulls and lightly built, could not able to withstand the recoil impact firing from cannon.  The Japanese commanding warships could carry about one to three cannons only.  The size of this warship was about 100 feet in length.  The cannons equipped on the Japanese Navy warships were inferior to the Korean because Hideyoshi focused on preparing their land armed forces.  During Imjin war, the Japanese armed forces realized the importance of cannon as the dominant weapon in maritime battles.  The Japanese Navy battle tactics were beginning with rapid approaching their warships to the opponent while firing their matchlock rifles.  When the Japanese warships reached the opponent ships, they would hook and grapple the opponent’s ship then quickly board to engage in close sword fighting on the decks (Turnbull, 2007, p. 35-36).

The Battle of Myongnyang took place on 26 October 1597 at Myongnyang strait.  Myongnyang strait is the gateway to the Yellow Sea between Chindo Island and the mainland on the extreme southwestern tip of the Korean peninsula.  The straight was narrow, shallow and left little room to maneuver.  The Japanese fleet with its 150 warships would be unable to surround the Korean ships giving the Koreans a tactical advantage here (Kenning, 2016, p. 1).

c5092047137a23aa1e1ef1638a9d154a_1637391679_0934.jpg

Two naval forces’ advancing routes during Battle of Myongnyang (Antique Alive, 2015, p. 1). 

             At the outset of the Battle of Myongnyang, the Korean Navy warships pre-staged at the North-Western side over Myongnyang strait.  The Japanese Navy warships pre-staged at the South-Eastern side below Myongnyang strait (Namu, 2016, p. 1).  From 6 October 1597 until the 26 October 1597 the Japanese attempted to dislodge the Korean ships from their positions to destroy them and allow the Japanese supply ships to enter the Yellow Sea.  Admiral Yi valiantly held the area, and by the 26th had destroyed 31 Japanese warships and damaged 92 more.  His knowledge of the area and his superior ship capability versus the Japanese ships carried the battle for him (Hawley, 2005, p. 483-489).  

The significance of this battle was the Korean Navy forces ability to regain naval supremacy after this battle.  This maritime battle allowed Korean Navy forces to cut off Japanese war reinforcement and supply routes to their land forces.  Therefore, Japanese land forces had not only stop advancing to north but also retreat down Southern side Korea.  Japanese Navy forces also fell back to Busan, Gyongsang Province, Korea.  The Japanese Navy forces did not venture west again.  Upon the death of Hideyoshi on 18 September 1598, all Japanese armed forces in Korea began to retreat to their country (Hawley, 2005, p. 530).  The battle of Myongnyang resulted in the Japanese armed forces ending their overseas war.

Another significance of the Korean Navy forces was that they were the first in Asia to use warship to warship cannon-gunfire tactics.  Before that, most warship to warship fighting tactics was focused on hand-to-hand fighting between crews.

The Korean Navy forces won at the battle of Myongnyang because the Korean Navy fully incorporated the intelligence that they had.  The Korean Navy forces fully understood enemy’s Order of Battle for advantages.  First of all, a disciplined and strong leadership led the well trained Korean Navy forces to victory despite miserable circumstances.  Admiral Yi’s strong leadership reinforced and maintained subordinates’ and all other supporters’ morale under a miserable situation.  The Korean Navy forces had also maximized their home field advantage.  The Korean Navy forces had fully analyzed the maritime terrain features to use them advantages to overcome numerical inferiority.  The Korean Navy forces’ warship structure was far superior than the Japanese which it allowed them to be equipped with powerful cannons that outranged the Japanese’ matchlock rifle and cannon.  The Korean Navy forces fired different types of ammunitions through the cannons, including anti-ship and mass anti-personnel which gave mass damages to the Japanese Navy forces.  The Korean Navy was well aware of the contrasts between their ships and Japanese ships leading to better implementation during the battle.  The taller built Korean warships prevented the Japanese Navy forces’ from using hand-to-hand battle tactics.  The taller built Korean warship enabled firing the Korean Navy forces’ cannons and arrows to be fired from a higher point giving them an advantage over the Japanese.  The Korean Navy forces brilliantly stopped the Japanese matchlock rifle attacks by improvising their rails of the warships with placing the soaked cotton blankets.  The Korean Navy forces made the Japanese Navy forces think that the Korean Navy still had a formidable number of warships by placing refugees’ ships behind their own.

The Korean Navy forces used their communication means, flag sign method, effectively when needed (Je, 2011, p. 1).  Fine weather contributed the Korean Navy forces firing their cannons accurately.  The Korean Navy forces patiently waited the Japanese Navy forces’ provocations in vicinity of Pyokpajin by frequently relocating their vessels formations.  Therefore, the Korean Navy forces were able to hide their true intent, engaging a maritime battle at Myongnyang strait.  The Korean Navy forces employed their scout units effectively as reconnaissance.  Therefore, the Korean Navy forces were able to take quick actions to avoid, advance, and fight by utilizing the intelligence fed from their prior reconnaissance.

The main reason of the Korean armed forces struggled to fight against the Japanese were lack of recognizing the modern fighting tactics by adapting an advanced armed equipment.  Behind these, the Korean royal court and King Seonjo were reluctant to adapt the advanced battle tactics.  The Korean royal court and King Seonjo concerned land armed forces the only main fighting assets without Navy forces.  The Korean royal court and King Seonjo didn’t realize the important of the Navy force that could’ve played as major defending forces against the Japanese invasion.  If the Korean royal court fully utilized their superior Navy forces against the Japanese invasion forces in the beginning, then the Japanese armed force could not land the Korean peninsula.   

The following reasons are why the Japanese Navy forces lost the battle of Myongnyang.  The Japanese didn’t fully analyze opponent in full spectrum order of battle incorporated with other intelligence factors.  The Japanese Navy forces were over-confident with their superior numbers as they crushed what they thought was the entire Korean Navy forces on 27 August 1597.  The Japanese Navy forces assumed that they could manage the fast current within the strait, because the Japanese Navy forces had been exposed to this type of terrain at their home sea.  The Japanese Navy forces also failed to fully analyze the Myongnyang Strait’s terrain characteristics with their avenues of approach, maneuverability, formations, and battle tactics.  The Japanese Navy forces had failed concerning their advancing route incorporating with the timeline of changing the directions of current.  The Japanese armed forces also were not fully creative in reorganizing and restructuring their assets during this war.  It seemed that the Japanese armed forces’ leaderships had narrow point of view when they planned maritime offensive operations.  The Japanese Navy forces’ course of actions at the battle of Myongnyang consisted of simply pushing themselves through the narrow strait without accounting for the Korean Navy forces’ long-range fire.

If the Japanese Navy force utilized their Human Intelligence assets, and fully analyzed their after action review every battle then they would’ve had different courses of action.  The following are several courses of actions (COA) that the Japanese armed force might had better chance to win against the Korean Navy forces at Myongnyang strait.  COA1. The Japanese Navy splits their forces into two groups.  In this scenario, the Japanese use one force to simply occupy the Koreans and flank around behind the Koreans with the other force.  This would create a pincer maneuver leading to the destruction of all Korean ships.  COA 2. The Japanese Navy forces make full use of hit-and-run tactics patiently by rotating many small groups frequently into the fight.  In this scenario, the entire Korean Navy forces with only 13 warships would be slowly killed as their crews became too weary to fight.  Eventually the Korean Navy forces would deplete their ammunition supplies.  COA 3. The Japanese Navy forces have the Japanese land armed force completely occupy the Jolla Province along the coastline.  In this scenario, the Korean Navy forces lose their naval bases for reinforcement, and supplies through the Korean peninsula.  Meanwhile, the rest of the Japanese Navy forces begin occupying the southern islands with their superior land combat capabilities.  Therefore, the Korean Navy forces have a hard time staging their warships for resupply.  COA 4. During the armistice period for three years, the Japanese Navy force could have reinforced or redesigned their warship structure by upgrading with strong building materials resourced from Korea.  In this scenario, the Japanese Navy forces can build sturdy warships to carry better cannons.  COA 5. If the Japanese armed forces utilize any combinations of above course of actions, then the Japanese Navy forces would have had better chance to eliminate the Korean Navy forces.   

By applying the several courses of actions introduced above, the Japanese armed forces could have had a better chance to gain the sea supremacy.  Therefore, the Japanese land armed forces would have had received reinforcement and resupply extending their reach into China.  The rapid reinforcement and resupply of the Japanese land armed force would’ve had contributed the Japanese occupying Korea much longer.  In addition, the China would’ve had a harder time fighting against diverse adversaries from every direction which include the Japanese armed forces.  This would have toppled the current dynasty and led to the likely rise of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) (Wu, 2016, p. 1).       

In conclusion, I analyzed how two adversaries prepared a historical battle within a war based on their assets, capabilities, and strategies.  I described the road to war, the misjudgments and mistakes of each side, and the courses of action which could have changed the battle’s outcome.  With fully maximizing intelligence resources will lead friendly forces to win a battle and this will contribute to impact to change the entire war situation (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990, p. 6).  I would like to close this writing with the following quotation.  “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle (Tzu, 1910, p. 52).”

 

 

References

 

Hawley, S. (2005). The Imjin War. Seoul, Korea: Samhwa Printing Company

Retrived from     http://www.samuelhawley.com/imjinarticle1a.html

Niderost, E. (2015, October 5). The Imjin War: The Japanese Invasion of Korea. Military

History. Retrived from http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/military-history/the-imjin-war-the-japanese-invasion-of-korea/

Martin, W. (2012, April 13). Joseon Navy. Launchistory.

             Retrived from http://launchistory.blogspot.com/2012/04/joseon-navy.html?view=sidebar

Ford, S. (1997). The Failure of the 16th Century Japanese Invasions of Korea. Research Projects

and Assorted Papers. Retrived from Http://www2.hawaii.edu/~sford/research/turtle/index.html

Polenghi, C. (2003, April 25). Hideyoshi and Korea. The Samurai Archives Japanese History

             Page. Retrived from http://www.samurai-archives.com/hak.html

Adventure Blog. (2016, June 25). Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Adventure Blog.

             Retrived from https://openendedsocialstudies.org/2016/06/25/admiral-yi-sun-sin

Szczepanski, K. (2016, March 28). The Imjin War, 1592-98. The History of War in Asia.

Retrived from http://asianhistory.about.com/od/warsinasia/fl/The-Imjin-War-1592-98.htm

Aleksander. (2012, July 18). The Japanese attempt to conquer the world. The History of War in

Asia. Archives. Retrived from https://aleksanderpwnz.wordpress.com/2012/07/

Smyser, A. (2016, September 1). TDISH: The Korean “Horatio Nelson”. Korean History.

             Retrived from https://historyisstrange.com/category/korean-history

Turnbull, S. (2002, May 1). Samurai Invasion Japan's Korean War 1592 -1598. United Kingdom:

Cassell. Retrived from https://issuu.com/doannguynhuchng/docs/nh___t_b___n_x__m_l_____c_tri___u_t

Siggurdsson. (2013, May 29). Battle of Sacheon: Korean Navy Using a "Turtle Ship" Defeats

Japanese. Siggurdsson’s blog. Retrived from

             http://burnpit.us/2013/05/battle-sacheon-korean-navy-using-turtle-ship-defeats-japanese

Turnbull, S. (2007, November 20). Pirate of the Far East: 811-1639. Oxford, United Kingdom:

Osprey Publishing. Retrived from https://books.google.com/books?id=X1mbCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA35&dq=Atakebune Sekibune&hl=ko&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjc1KrC1rbQAhUni1QKHTp-AWoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=Atakebune%20Sekibune&f=false

Kenning, T. (2016, June 25). Admiral Yi Sun-sin. My Padlets. Retrived from

             https://padlet.com/tkenning/admiralyi

Antique Alive. (2015). Admiral Yi Sun-shin. History. Retrived from

http://www.antiquealive.com/Blogs/Admiral_Yi_Sun_Shin.html

Namu, W. (2016). The Battle of Myongnyang. Yi, Sun-shin. Retrived from

             https://namu.wiki/w/명량 해전

Je, J. (2011). The Forms and Use of Joseon Navy's Flags during Japanese Invasion. Journal of

Jangseogak archives. Retrived from http://scholar.ndsl.kr/schArticleDetail.do?cn=NART69849927

Wu, A. (2016, November 7). The Qing Dynasty. China History. Retrived from

            http://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/china-history/the-qing-dynasty.htm

Headquarters, Department of the Army. (1990, March 1). FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis.

            Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiz4dW9m7vQAhUmi1QKHRJTAy0QFgghMAA&url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/34-3/fm34-3.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEwTJB4UPoj4tmTofjnChLc1iZnGw

Tzu, S. (1910). The Art of War Sun Tzu (L. Giles, Trans.). Portland, United States: The Puppet Press. (Original work published 1905)

Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwjg3PXql7bQAhVolVQKHZBoDMEQFgghMAA&url=http://www.puppetpress.com/classics/ArtofWarbySunTzu.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGzLuisu--L0I0zoKTSbQTZJ0L5gw&bvm=bv.139250283,d.cGc


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댓글 22 / 1 페이지

lsajy님의 댓글

좋은 글 감사합니다. 충무공의 위대함을 더욱더 느낍니다. 이 글을 쓰시느라 고생 많으셨겠네요.. 다시 한번 감사드립니다.

당췌몰라님의 댓글

명량해전
이 논문의 목적은 어떻게 분석하는지 분석하는 것이다.
두 명의 적수가 그들의 자산을 기반으로 전쟁 내에서 역사적인 전투를 준비했다.
기능 및 전략.  그
임진왜란이라고도 알려진 임진왜란 (Hawley, 2005, p.
1-664년)은 1592년에 시작하여 1598년까지 지속되었다.  전쟁이 발발한 직후, 중국인들은
일본군에 대한 무력 개입 (Hawley, 2005, 페이지 228).  임진왜란 동안, "사적 전쟁"이라고 불리는 주요 역사적 전투가 있었다.
명량해전은 전쟁의 판도를 바꾸는 데 큰 영향을 미쳤다.
반대 방향  나는 쉴 작정이다.
전쟁으로 가는 길, 양측의 오판과 실수, 그리고 의 과정
전투의 결과를 바꿀 수 있는 행동이었다.
에 앞서
임진왜란, 한국은 국력이 약해진 상태였다.  정치적 분쟁, 적응력 부족, 그리고
준비 부족이 모두 한국이 약하다는 인식에 한몫했다.  준비가 안 된 이유는.
한국 동남부가 이전에 전쟁 상태에 있었던 적이 없다는 단순한 사실
이 침략(Niderost, 2015, 페이지 1)  해적질
한국인들에게 주요한 문제였지만, 이것은 축복이었다
위장을 하다  해적들을 따라잡기 위해
그러나 한국 해군은 그들의 장비를 지속적으로 훈련하고 업그레이드해야 했다.
그들은 지상 기반 운영에 장비를 활용하는 방법을 알지 못했다(Martin,
2012년, 1페이지).
일본인들
군대는 잘 훈련되고, 훈련되고, 조직되었다.
전쟁 기간 내내 경험 많은 군벌 지휘관들  전쟁 기간 동안, 일본인들은
군대는 효과적으로 중세 스타일의 전투 훈련과 전술을 다듬었다.
매치락 라이플 유닛을 추가함으로써(Ford, 1997, 페이지 1).  그러므로 일본군의 정예화는
전투 전술은 기병 부대, 매치락 소총 부대,
활쏘기 부대, 창 부대, 검 부대.  일본군의 세련된 전투
전술은 한국인보다 큰 이점이었다.  한국은 약했고 히데요시, 사령관은
일본군은 이것을 이용하여 그의 침략 계획을 계속했다.
중국 본토(폴렝기, 2003, 페이지 1) . . . . .

tommkr님의 댓글의 댓글

명량대첩이 임진왜란 전세의
'판도'를 바꾸는 역사적 위대한 전투였습니다.

육지전투에 강한 일본이 중국쪽으로 진격하기위해
해상 보급로를 '진도 울돌목'을 통해서 올라가야 하는데
명량대첩으로 일본 육지 '병력' 보급이 막히고
후퇴하게 되는 중요한 해전이 바로 명량대첩 입니다

조선 조정의 뒷받침도 열악한 상태에서
충무공님과 그휘하 장수들이 목숨 걸고 지키신 진도 울돌목 명량대첩

조선병력의 장단점 vs 일본병력의 장단점
조선수군 배의 특징 vs 일본수군 배의 특징
지형적인 잇점과 불리한점 등등이 주 내용 입니다

livinglegend님의 댓글의 댓글

국수적인 시각으로만 기억하고 있는 임진왜란과 상황에 대해 남다르고 겍관적인 시각을 제시해주는군요. 감사합니다! ^^

tommkr님의 댓글의 댓글

조선수군 배에 쓰여진 목재 재질과 '평저선'
vs
일본수군 배에 사용된 목재 재질과 '첨저선'

이것을 토대로,
물량 적재 성능 배수량 (커다란 대포를 탑재하는 능력 유무)
선회반경
거친물살을 버티고 기동하는 장단점
울돌목의 시간적 조류 변화

요런걸 면밀히 따져서 비교해 보면
명량대첩~~
상당히 과학적이고 치밀하고 고도로 계산된
역대급 해상전투였음을 알 수 있습니다 ^^

livinglegend님의 댓글

예, 아무튼 시공은 다르지만, 같은 곳을 추억할 수 있는 분들을 이곳에서 만난다는 것도 쉬운 일은 아니어서요^^ tommkr 님께서도 건강하고 좋은 시간 이어가시길... ^^
같은 글에의 댓글은 5개 이상은 안된다고 뜨기에 그냥 여기 끄적여봅니다^^

tommkr님의 댓글의 댓글

리빙님 덕분에 오랜만에 잊고 있었던,
그때 그시절을 느낄 수 있었네요 ^^
묘하고도 즐거웠습니다.
고맙습니다.
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